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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joe Ransom appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief.

On appeal, Mr. Ransom argues that the district court erred when it

summarily dismissed his post-conviction action without providing him prior notice of its reasons
for summary dismissal and twenty days to respond.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ransom was convicted of rape and first degree kidnapping. (R., p.645.) He was
sentenced to life, with ten years fixed, on each charge, to be served concurrently. (R., p.647.)
Mr. Ransom timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction, and on April 27, 2017, the Court
of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion which affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v.
Ransom, No. 44871, 2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 598 (Sept. 26, 2017).
On October 5, 2018, Mr. Ransom filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, in which
he asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for:

( 1) failing to investigate by failing to

engage an expert witness to examine text messages and phone calls so that Mr. Ransom could
confront allegations relating to those methods of communication; (2) failing to subpoena the
records concerning the text messages and phone calls; and (3) failing to present exculpatory
witness testimony due to inadequate investigation and preparation. (R., pp.5-649.) Mr. Ransom
also asserted that his trial counsel was deficient for misunderstanding the burden of proof and
misstating the law in closing arguments. (R., pp.6-7.) Mr. Ransom alleged that trial counsel told
the jury "if you believe one of them, you have to decide that you believe them beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the other story doesn't have any validity," which he argued was a
misstatement of the law. (R., pp.6-7.) The petition went on to allege that, but for this deficient
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conduct, which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Mr. Ransom would not have
been convicted at trial. (R., p.7.) Mr. Ransom attached the transcripts of his preliminary hearing
and the jury trial to the petition. (R., pp. I 0-649.)
The State, in lieu of filing an answer, filed a motion for summary dismissal of
Mr. Ransom's petition. (R., pp.653-60.)
Approximately two months later, Mr. Ransom filed an affidavit in which he identified the
witnesses and what they would have testified to, had they been interviewed by his trial attorney
or testified at trial. (R. pp.678-82.) He also averred that the cell phone records, photographs and
text messages were of critical importance to his case; however, his attorney did not provide him
with a copy of the results of the defense expert's examination of the phone.

(R., p.679.)

Mr. Ransom also filed a brief opposing the State's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.69198.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal.
(R., p.699; see 3/5/19 Tr.) Eleven days after hearing the State's motion for summary dismissal,

the district court granted the motion and summarily dismissed Mr. Ransom's petition.
(R., pp.700, 704-05.)

Thereafter, the district court entered a final judgment, from which

Mr. Ransom timely appealed. (R., pp.721-24.)
On appeal, Mr. Ransom tends the district court dismissed for reasons other than those
identified by the State in conjunction with its motion to dismiss. Accordingly, he never had prior
notice of the ultimate reasons for dismissal, or an opportunity to respond. He contends that
dismissal without the requisite notice was error.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Ransom's post-conviction petition without
providing him notice and time to respond to the reasons for which it ultimately dismissed the
petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Ransom's Post-Conviction Petition Without
Providing Him Notice And Time To Respond To The Reasons For Which It Ultimately
Dismissed The Petition

A.

Standard Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil, rather than criminal, m

nature; and like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon
which the requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 145
Idaho 437, 443 (2008). But, unlike a complaint in other civil cases, the original post-conviction
petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of the claim." Id. at 443444. Rather, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting
the allegations contained therein, or else the post-conviction petition may be subject to
dismissal. Id. In addition, the post-conviction petition must set forth with specificity the legal
grounds upon which the application is based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010).
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the
petition, and evidence supporting the petition, fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that,
if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. Yakovac,
145 Idaho at 444. Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is the procedural
equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437-38
(Ct. App. 2007). The United States Supreme Court has defmed the standard for whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the
need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
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be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Yakovac,

145 Idaho at 444. The burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. See, e.g.,
KGF Development, LLC v. City ofKetchum, 149 Idaho 524 (2010).
The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be regarded as true" for purposes of
summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009).

Any disputed facts are

construed in favor of the non-moving party, and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45
(2009).

B.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Ransom's Post-Conviction Petition
Without Providing Him Notice And Time To Respond To The Reasons For Which It
Ultimately Dismissed The Petition
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must

show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the
petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155,
158-159 (Ct. App. 1993).
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section l 9-4906(b), the district court may dismiss a postconviction applicant's petition "if the court provides the applicant with notice of its intent to do
so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be dismissed, and twenty days for the
applicant to respond." Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517 (Ct. App. 2009). Pursuant to Idaho
Code section 19-4906(c), a district court can also dismiss a post-conviction petition upon the
State's motion for summary judgment. Id.
particularity."

The grounds for dismissal must be stated "with

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995) (emphasis in original)

(holding district court improperly dismissed petition where the State's prayer for relief in the
5

Answer was deficient for not stating its grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was
a motion for summary disposition under LC. § 19-4906(c)). However, "[a]fter the state files a
[I. C. § 4906] subsection (c) motion, a petitioner is still entitled to twenty days to respond, so as
to afford an opportunity to establish a material fact issue." Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322. If,
after the State files a motion under subsection (c), the district court dismisses a post-conviction
petition pursuant to the State's motion without first providing twenty days notice, the order
dismissing the petition will be reversed. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321; Franck-Teel v. State,
143 Idaho 664, 668 (Ct. App. 2006).

Further, should the State file a motion for summary

disposition, but the court dismiss the petition on grounds different from those asserted in the
State's motion, the dismissal is at the court's own initiative and it must provide the requisite
twenty days notice. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322; see also Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,
760 (Ct. App. 1982).
In this case, the State filed a motion for summary disposition and supporting brief
(R., pp.653-60.) The State sought dismissal based on the argument that Mr. Ransom's petition

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (R., p.653.) The State provided documentation
that the alleged victim's phone was given to defense investigators who took it to an expert in
Spokane, Washington. (R., pp.658, 661-63.) The State also claimed that Mr. Ransom did not
present any facts in support of his assertions that his counsel failed to interview and call
witnesses with exculpatory testimony. (R., p.659.) As for the claim that trial counsel's closing
argument contained errors and misstatements of the law, the State asked the district court to
review a portion of the trial transcript, which demonstrated that counsel did understand the
applicable laws and burden of proof (R., p.659.)
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At the hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal, the prosecutor implied that
the expected testimony of one of the potential witnesses, as described in Mr. Ransom's affidavit,
was "ridiculous." (3/5/19 Tr., p.6, L2 - p.7, L.10.) The prosecutor argued that Mr. Ransom's
claims were not sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. (3/5/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.11-13.) The
prosecutor told the district court that the phone evidence was bad for Mr. Ransom, "And so we
can speculate on how it could potentially help him; but it didn't help him, it didn't help him."
(3/5/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-16.) The prosecutor presumed that any information on the victim's phone
was given to the defense team, but that the information did not help the defense, "it hurt them."
(3/5/19 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.1.) The prosecutor asked the court to summarily dismiss the
petition. (3/5/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-5.)
Post-conviction counsel asked the district court to consider the big picture-that
Mr. Ransom's public defender was very busy with very little time to speak to her client, and they
did not have a good relationship. (3/5/19 Tr., p.8, L.10-p.9, L.11.) In light of this context,
there were not tactical or strategic reasons for the decisions described in the Petition and
Mr. Ransom's affidavit. (3/5/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18.) Post-conviction counsel reminded the court
that there was a great deal of phone information that was never examined, and trial counsel did
not question the State's detective on the 500 text messages between the alleged victim and
Mr. Ransom. (3/5/19 Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.22.) Post-conviction counsel clarified that defense
counsel's investigator simply had the information downloaded, not examined by an expert, and
there was "nothing in the record to indicate that defense counsel ever looked at any of that
information."

(3/5/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-25.)

Post-conviction counsel pointed out that the

prosecutor's conclusion that there was not much information on Mr. Ransom's phone was not
supported by evidence or testimony, and the record reflected that defense counsel did not know
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what was on Mr. Ransom's phone and did not even attempt to find the text messages
corroborating Mr. Ransom's averment that he was invited to the location of the alleged rape on
the night in question. (3/5/19 Tr., 12, L.12 - p.13, L.20.) Under Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33
(2017), trial counsel does not get the benefit of a strategy presumption "when it's clear that trial
counsel simply missed the issue. And in this case, it's clear that [defense counsel] simply missed
the issue." (3/5/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-20.) Post-conviction counsel asserted that there was a genuine
issue of material fact where the parties had contradictory information regarding whether these
two phones contained information exculpatory to Mr. Ransom which was not investigated by his
trial counsel. (3/5/19 Tr., p.13, L.21 -p.14, L.5.)
Post-conviction counsel pointed out that Mr. Ransom's affidavit was the most cognizant
and objective piece of evidence in the post-conviction case, and that most of his statements were
uncontroverted by the State. (3/5/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-11.) Counsel asked the district court to set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (3/5/19 Tr., p.15, L.8 -p.16, L.3.)
Eleven days later, the district court dismissed the petition. The court first found that
portions of Mr. Ransom's affidavit contained inadmissible evidence. (R., pp.704-05.) The court
determined that the record disproved Mr. Ransom's claims that his trial counsel should have
engaged a telecommunications expert to aid the defense in confronting the allegations related to
text messages and phone call, and that counsel should have subpoenaed the phone carriers for
both Mr. Ransom and the alleged victim. (R., pp.706-07.) In so finding, the district court cited
to portions of the trial testimony in which defense counsel cross-examined the detective who
examined Mr. Ransom's phone.

(R., pp.707-09.)

The district court next concluded that

Mr. Ransom's claim that a detective testified about hundreds of photographs of alleged text
messages obtained from the complaining witness's phone was disproven by the record where the
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detective actually testified about hundreds of text messages from the defendant's phone.
(R., pp.708-09.) The court thus concluded that that claim was disproven by the record, and also
noted that there was no evidence of prejudice as to that claim. (R., p.711.) The court found that
Mr. Ransom provided absolutely no admissible evidence as to how trial counsel's failure to
engage in a telecommunications expert or subpoena the phone carrier records fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, or how doing so could have changed the outcome of the
trial. (R., p. 711.)
As for Mr. Ransom's second post-conviction claim-that his trial counsel failed to call
several exculpatory witnesses-the district court found that, while Mr. Ransom asserted what
these people would have testified to, he failed to submit affidavits from them, thus the summary
of expected testimony in his affidavit was speculative. (R., p.713.) In so deciding, the district
court relied on Adams v. State, 161 Idaho 485 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding petitioner failed to
introduce into evidence nonhearsay affidavits from the witnesses as to what they would have
testified to and fmding that lack of evidence warranted summary dismissal). (R., p.714.) The
court concluded that "Mr. Ransom has failed to provide admissible evidence concerning the
substance of these witnesses' testimony. He has also failed to establish that Ms. Frost-who was
never called-would have been available to testify, and that any of these four individuals would
have testified consistently with the statements made in his affidavit." 1 (R., pp. 713-14.)
As for Mr. Ransom's third claim that his trial counsel's performance was deficient for
misstating the law at closing argument, the district court concluded that Mr. Ransom was taking
a sentence out of context, and there was no evidence of deficient performance or that such
deficiency prejudiced Mr. Ransom's case. (R., pp.714-16.)
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However, even during the State's hearing on its motion to dismiss, Mr. Ransom was not
notified that he needed to prepare and file affidavits from the witnesses who would have testified
for the defense, and he was never notified that this could be a basis for dismissal of the claim.
(See 3/5/19 Tr.) Although at the hearing, the State claimed that one witness's information was
not credible and it was hearsay contained in Mr. Ransom's affidavit, the State never sought
dismissal on the basis that Idaho case law required affidavits from each witness as to the
substance of their testimony, had they been called at trial. (3/5/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-15.) Nor did
the district court tell Mr. Ransom that it intended to dismiss the petition for this reason. (See
3/5/19 Tr.)
Mr. Ransom's petition was not dismissed for the reasons sought by the State, where the
State only generally stated that it sought dismissal because Mr. Ransom's petition failed to raise
a genume issue of material fact regarding deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
(R., pp.653-60.)

Regarding the exculpatory witness testimony, the State claimed that

Mr. Ransom did not present any facts in support of this conclusory statement, and that if
Mr. Ransom had alibi witnesses he should have given that information to trial and postconviction counsel.

(R., p.659.) Notably, the State did not assert that Adams required the

submission of affidavits from the witnesses defense counsel failed to call at trial. Where the
district court summarily dismisses a petition for post-conviction relief on grounds not raised or
argued by the State, the district court must give notice. Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho at 760.
As such, the district court erred because it failed to provide Mr. Ransom notice of the
reasons it intended to summarily dismiss the petition as well as the full twenty days to respond,

1

Crystal Frost was identified in Mr. Ransom's affidavit as a person with knowledge of
Mr. Ransom's inability to perform sexually when under the influence of alcohol. (R., p.680.)
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which is required under Saykhamchone.

In the process, Mr. Ransom lost his opportunity to

present facts and evidence in support of his claims and his assertions of prejudice.
Had Mr. Ransom been notified that the court intended to dismiss for the reasons it
actually dismissed the petition, and had he been allotted the requisite twenty-day period to
respond, Mr. Ransom would likely have provided additional information such as witness
affidavits in support of his petition that would have entitled him to a full evidentiary hearing on
all of his post-conviction claims.

In sum, the district court erred when it failed to provide

Mr. Ransom notice of the reasons why it would ultimately dismiss the petition and twenty days
to respond to the notice.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ransom respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 29 th day ofNovember, 2019.
/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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